Aug 15, 20233 min read

X Force Keygen Vault Office 2008

B-57 D aircraft used for atomic cloud sampling operations during Operation Hardtack nuclear test series (April-August 1958) Source: U.S. National Archives, Still Pictures Division, Record Group 374, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 374-ANT, box 5, Project 23 Operation Hardtack WDC-1C-20. Washington, D.C., April 30, 2008 - The U.S. Air Force expected to use nuclear weapons against China during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, but President Eisenhower required the Air Force to plan initially to use conventional bombs against Chinese forces if the crisis escalated, according to a previously secret Air Force history obtained from a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit and posted today by the National Security Archive. Eisenhower's instructions astounded the Air Force leadership, but according to Bernard Nalty, the author of one of the studies released today, U.S. policymakers recognized that atomic strikes had "inherent disadvantages" because of the fall-out danger in the region as well as the risk of escalation.

Document 11: "Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958," by Jacob Van Staaveren, Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, November 1962, SecretThis account provides comprehensive coverage of Air force nuclear and non-nuclear planning, organization, and operations, as well as significant detail on Navy, Marines, and Taiwanese military activities, during the second Taiwan Strait crisis. While the author did not have Nalty's access to information about the White House role in contingency planning, he gives the reader a total picture of the U.S.'s "show of force", which included massive Naval deployments and the creation of a special Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) "X-Ray Tango." While contingency plans called for nuclear strikes launched from Clark Air Base (Philippines) and Kadena Air Base (Okinawa) in the event of a direct U.S.-China military confrontation (p. 16), the services had to re-do their plans once they had received Eisenhower's instructions to plan for non-nuclear attacks. As Van Staaverern argues, this requirement caused "much anxiety" among U.S. military leaders in the Pacific, who worried that non-nuclear operations might not work, partly because of the size of Chinese forces, but also because of shortages of "iron bombs," among other supplies. (Pages 28, 5, 55) Nevertheless, the crisis did not break out into armed conflict, an outcome for which both the Navy and the Air Force tried to take credit (p. 57), although they were unaware that Mao Zedong intended to keep the crisis within bounds and avoid any direct confrontation with U.S. forces. (Note 9) Document 12: "Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958," by Arthur C. O'Neill, Pacific Air Force, Fifth Air Force, Office of Information Services, Director of Historical Services, 31 December 1958, Top SecretPrepared only months after the events, with re-deployments from the build-up then under way, the author's access to relevant documents as well as interviews with Air Force officers, helped him prepare a finely grained account of almost every aspect of Fifth Air Force activities during the crisis. Headquartered in Japan, the coverage of the build-up of non-nuclear air forces shows the disruptive impact of crisis operations: the U.S. base at Kadena became so crowded that Air Force leaders had to consider alternative basing. Adding to the pressure was the possibility that the Japanese government might object to the use of the bases for operations against China, a problem that made the Air Force look closely at U.S. bases in the Philippines and Korea (pages 16-17). Additional evidence on the problems caused by Eisenhower's requirement for non-nuclear operations showed up in messages from the commander of the 313th Air Division, who complained about "'major deficiencies'" in personal and equipment for handling conventional bombs" (p. 59). Also of interest is the chapter on intelligence work prior to and during the crisis, where the author argues that the Fifth Air Force Intelligence Office had "fully anticipated" the Chinese bombardment of the Offshore Islands in late August 1958 (p. 32). Moreover, the author provided detailed coverage of combat operations between Chinese MIGs and Taiwanese F-86Fs; the Taiwanese were equipped with U.S.-supplied heat-seeking Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, which gave the Air Force an opportunity to evaluate the performance of this new weapon.